

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 RANGOO 00630 120950 Z

11

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-13 ADP-00 T-03 OMB-01 NIC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 SAL-01 RSR-01 /134 W

----- 027384

R 120835 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6551

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY ROKYO

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T RANGOON 0630

E. O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR BM

SUBJECT: BURMA' S FEAR OF PRC AFFECTS POLICY

REF: RANGOON 227

1. SUMMARY: GUB' S POLICY OF NON- ALIGNMENT AND ISOLATION WHICH IT HAS RELIED ON TO KEEP BURMA OUT OF HARM' S WAY DURING THE PERIOD OF COLD WAR CONFRONTATION CAN NO LONGER ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARD GUB' S INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY VIS- A - VIS CHINA, IN PERIOD OF DETENTE AMONG THE GREAT POWERS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GUB IS CASTING ABOUT FOR DIPLOMATIC BOLSTERING. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 RANGOO 00630 120950 Z

2. SINCE SIGNING OF VIETNAM CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND ISSUANCE OF GUB JANUARY 26 COMMUNIQUE WELCOMING IT, EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF HIGH- LEVEL GUB ANXIETY ABOUT PRC SUPPORT OF BURMESE COMMUNIST PART ( BCP) INSURGENTS. ( PRC AMBASSADOR TO BURMA CHEN CHAO- YUAN RECENTLY SHOCKED JAPANESE AMBASSADOR BY ACKNOWLEDGING AND JUSTIFYING IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION CHINESE SUPPORT OF BCP). WHAT BURMESE REFER TO AS " TWO- FACED" PRC POLICY OF CARRYING ON FRIENDLY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GUB ON ONE HAND AND SUPPORT BCP INSURGENTS ON OTHER HAS GUB BAFFLED AS WELL AS WORRIED. IT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH PEKING ON BCP ISSUE. THUS NE WIN TOLD LLOYD HAND FEBRUARY 20 THAT THERE IS " NO USE TALKING" TO PEKING SINCE PEKING DISAVOWS CHINESE SUPPORT OF INSURGENTS BY SAYING IT IS MERELY A " PARTY AFFAIR".

3. FRUSTRATING INABILITY OF GUB TO DISCUSS LET ALONE GET SATISFACTION FROM PEKING ON BCP ISSUE IS CAUSING GUB TO CAST ABOUT FOR DIPLOMATIC HELP. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH VICE CHIEF OF STAFF BRIGADIER TIN U AND MIS CHIEF, LTCOLONEL TIN OO, IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS EXPRESSED HOPE TO JAPANESE AMBASSADOR THAT WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND PRC, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN PEKING MIGHT INTERCEDE FOR GUB WITH CHINESE. ( TIN OO EVEN WENT SO FAR AS HOPING THAT U. S. MIGHT DO THE SAME WHEN ITS LIAISON OFFICE IS ESTABLISHED).

4. AGAINST THESE PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF ANXIETY THE JANUARY 26 COMMUNIQUE SIGNALLING GUB' S DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO BUILD DURABLE PEACE CAN BE SEEN AS MOTIVATED IN PART AT LEAST BY GUB' S DESIRE FOR DIPLOMATIC BOLSTERING VIS- A- VIS PEKING. IN FACT CURRENT VISIT OF GUB FOREIGN MINISTER TO THAILAND, WHICH IS MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTION SO FAR IMPLEMENTING JANUARY 26 COMMUNIQUE, UNDOUBTEDLY RELATES DIRECTLY TO GUB' S FEARS OF PRC. THUS IF VISIT RESULTS IN REDUCTION OF OPERATIONS OF THAILAND- BASED ANTI- GUB INSURGENTS ( ESPECIALLY U NU FOLLOWING) IT WILL STRENGTHEN GUB' S HAND AGAINST CHINA- BASED BCP INSURGENTS AND THUS AGAINST PRC PRESSURES.

5. IN THE PAST THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION HERE THAT IF BCP MILITARY PRESSURE GETS DANGEROUS ENOUGH GUB MIGHT OBTAIN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM SOVIETS EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 RANGOO 00630 120950 Z

THROUGH AN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY. HOWEVER, NE WIN

REPORTEDLY

TOLD VISITING MALAYSIAN CHIEF OF STAFF LAST MONTH THAT USSR  
PULL- OUT OF UAR SHOWED THAT BIG POWERS COULD NOT BE RELIED  
UPON FOR HELP. MOREOVER, RECEIPT OF SOVIET ARMS WOULD CERTAINLY  
INFLAME PRC SUSPICIONS AND MIGHT WELL LEAD TO GREATER  
CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THE BCP. BEST COURSE FOR GUB WOULD THUS  
SEEM TO BE TO MAINTAIN DISCREET BALANCE AMONG THE BIG POWERS  
WHILE SEEKING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ITS REGIONAL NEIGHBORS TO  
HELP IT COPE WITH AN UNCERTAIN CHINA.

MARTIN

SECRET

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:**  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 MAR 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973RANGOO00630  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** XGDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** RANGOON  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730324/aaaahjxh.tel  
**Line Count:** 129  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 73 RANGOON 227  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 JUL 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24-Jul-2001 by elyme>; APPROVED <23-Aug-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> jms 971117  
**Subject:** BURMA' S FEAR OF PRC AFFECTS POLICY  
**TAGS:** PFOR, BM, n/a  
**To:** BANGKOK  
CANBERRA  
DACCA  
EA  
JAKARTA  
KUALA LUMPUR  
MANILA

NEW DELHI  
SECSTATE WASHDC

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005